Nietzsche's Philosophical Tapestry: Deconstructing Modernity, Revaluing Values, and the Übermensch's Ascent Beyond Apollonian and Dionysian Dichotomies

A conversation between Guity Novin and Farid Novin 

Guity Novin (G): Today, Nietzsche is perhaps one of the most penetrating and admired sages in European thought and wisdom. According to Heidegger, he brought the end of metaphysics. Many intellectuals today have considered the new ideas of Europe as a continuation of his ideas. For example, Jacques Derrida recognizes Nietzsche as a clear example of the thinker "implementing the structure" of deconstructionism. There are many books written about Nietzsche in European and American countries. For example, in France in the 1980s, Jean Granier, Maurice Blanchot, Pierre Klosowski, Jean-Michel Rey, Bernard Poitre, Pierre Rondeau, Sarah Kaufman, and Paul Valadier wrote books about him. Of course, in Iran, there are books by him under the titles such as "Thus Said Zarathustra" translated by Dariush Ashouri, "Now That Man: How a Man Becomes What He Is" translated by Behrouz Safdari, "Beyond Good and Bad" translated by Saeed Firouzabadi and a number of others have been published, but unfortunately, the translations are not very expressive because, as we will see, understanding Nietzsche's works is not an easy task due to his lyrical style and his logical inconsistencies. However, as Walter Kaufman writes in his book about Nietzsche:

all kinds of people; Among the stylists, they have written about Nietzsche, but in addition to many prominent poets and renowned researchers, Thomas Mann, Camus, Jasper, and Heidegger can be mentioned; among the important writers who have worked in spreading his ideas. To say the least, no modern thinker after Kant and Hegel has ever been honored by such elite writers. However, many of these researches, which have been carried out by highly praised thinkers, are based on very unstable researches, and this laxity sometimes does not fit into the belief.

And to be honest, in the writings of Dariush Ashuri about Nietzsche, without any doubt, as we will see, they tell about a wrong and reversed perception about Nietzsche. And this is why in order to properly understand Nietzsche, one must know the wisdom of Descartes, Kant and Hegel correctly and be familiar with Newton's physics and mathematics in order to be able to understand the context of some of his propositions such as the "eternal recurrent of the same" in Die Ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen difficult to comprehend. And the translation of his works will not only be possible with the help of a dictionary of words.

In this discussion, we will try as much as possible to include reports and evidence from books and writings such as Heidegger's work on Nietzsche, as well as Kaufman's book "Nietzsche" and writings by Michel Foucault, especially his writing "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire, and from Nietzsche's own books "The Birth of Tragedy or Hellenism and Pessimism" Die Geburt der Tragödie, Oder: Griechentum und Pessimismus, "Beyond Goodness and Sin - An Introduction to Future Wisdom" Jenseits von Gut und Böse - Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft, "On the genealogy of character" Zur Genealogie der Moral, "Look at that man" Ecce homo, "The will to power" Der Wille zur Macht, "Thus spake Zarathustra"* Also sprach Zarathustra, "Pagahan - Thoughts on Let's examine Morgenröthe - Gedanken über die moralischen Vorurtheile and Der Antichrist in order to put an end to some of the false and misleading perceptions of Nietzsche's thoughts.

Nietzsche's difficulty and inconsistency

Farid Novin (F): I am sure that many people know that it is very difficult to know Nietzsche, and maybe that is why both socialists and fascists and modernists and postmodernists and existentialists know Nietzsche as their own! Therefore, it can be difficult to identify him among all false impressions. Nietzsche is always referred to as an aphoristic "identifier" author. He uses these identifications and aphorisms, which are the foundations of his thoughts, like bricks, to build his intellectual structure. However, many of those ideas are incompatible with each other and we must discuss these inconsistencies in this conversation. And sometimes Nietzsche uses irony in his identification writings to tell the bitter truth 'ridendo dicere severum' in a witty tone and cleverly hides it in the context of his writings without giving the reader a key to find out whether his impression is a joke or the truth. He saw himself as a successor of a philosopher and an artist in a model like Plato, who was able to criticize and destroy Christianity.

G: That's right. And what is more important is that he has provided one of the greatest and most valuable critiques of Western thought, not in the vein of a philosophical origin, but in the vein of a cultural origin. And because of this, it can be said that he was more than anything a philosopher and intellectual of culture. So, in the course of these conversations, it might not be pointless to first discuss Nietzsche's views on freedom, democracy, and modernity, and then discuss the philosophical context of his thoughts.

Nietzsche's ideas about freedom and democracy seem very immature and even stupid at first glance. Maybe he is so angry and frustrated that he especially wants to make his reader angry. This is why even intellectuals like Bertrand Russell ridiculed his ideas.  Nietzsche discusses his thoughts on freedom in *The Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophize with a Hammer* (*Götzen-Dämmerung oder Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophiert*). He provocatively asserts:

"My thoughts on freedom: Sometimes, the true worth of something is not found in what it allows us to gain, but rather in what it costs us—the price we must pay. Consider, for instance, libertarian institutions. Once freedom is achieved, these institutions often become an oppressive burden, a costly plague that undermines the very freedom they were intended to safeguard. They owe their existence to the overthrow of the 'will to power' (*den Willen zur Macht*). They pave over the rough and wild terrain of the soul, like the moors and hills of the English Channel, in order to establish a regime of uniformity—one that breeds contempt, fear, and pleasure in equal measure. Yet, they always bring victory to the masses, who gather like herds.

Freedom, in its truest sense, is not a pastoral idyll, but rather the raising of flocks. However, when a war is waged to establish these very institutions, something different emerges: war becomes the crucible of freedom, a force that stirs it powerfully into existence. From a deeper perspective, it is the war itself—not the institutions—that engenders these destructions. This war for the establishment of liberal institutions (*der Krieg um liberale Institutionen*) paradoxically creates the conditions for freedom.

But what is freedom? It is the desire of every individual to assume responsibility for themselves. It is the respect for distance, the space that separates us from others. It is the ability to remain unmoved by impulses, hardships, trivialities, and even life itself. It is the readiness to sacrifice human lives—whether others' or one’s own—for the sake of one’s own purpose.

Freedom, then, is when the instincts of strength, war, and joy triumph over other instincts, such as the pursuit of 'happiness.' The liberated man (*freigewordene Mensch*), and even more so the liberated spirit, tramples underfoot the modest comforts that are the dreams of shopkeepers, Christians, cattle, women, Englishmen, and other democrats. A free man is a warrior."

In this passage, Nietzsche forcefully rejects the notion of freedom as a passive state of contentment. Instead, he envisions freedom as a dynamic struggle—one that requires both individual strength and a willingness to embrace conflict and sacrifice. Nietzsche writes:

"By what measure is freedom evaluated among individuals and among the masses? It is measured by the resistance that confronts it—the resistance that must be overcome—and by the effort required to remain above it. The highest expression of freedom is found where the fiercest resistance to domination has arisen, standing but a few steps away from tyranny, and perilously close to the dread frontier of slavery.

This is psychologically true, especially when we consider the noble and unrestrained instincts of autocratic rulers, who challenge the most formidable authority and discipline (*Autorität und Zucht*)—the finest example of which is Julius Caesar. And from a political standpoint, it holds true as well when we trace this phenomenon through history. Those who have proven themselves valuable, who have carved their worth into the fabric of history, have never done so under liberal institutions. Instead, it is the presence of great danger that forges them into something exceptional. This danger, in turn, reveals to us our resources, our tools, our virtues. It forces us to recognize that our strength lies in our defenses, our combativeness, and our essence—qualities that enable us to remain powerful.

The fundamental lesson is this: We must be strong, or we shall never be strong. Those great hothouses of power (*jene großen Treibhäuser für starke*), such as the aristocratic societies of Rome and Venice, understood freedom as narrowly as I do: as something to be gained by what we possess, what we do not possess, and what we strive to overcome.

 Nietzsche's conception of freedom is intrinsically tied to his critique of modernity and his philosophy of power. He posits that freedom's measure, both for individuals and masses, is determined by the magnitude of resistance they must overcome. This perspective aligns with his broader concept of the "will to power" (Wille zur Macht), a central tenet in Nietzschean philosophy.

Nietzsche envisions the freest individual as one who exists in proximity to tyranny, constantly challenging and overcoming formidable obstacles. He cites Julius Caesar as an exemplar of this ideal - a ruler who embodied the synthesis of noble instincts and disciplined authority.

This view of freedom is inextricably linked to Nietzsche's admiration for aristocratic societies like those of ancient Rome and Venice. In these contexts, freedom was understood not as a universal right, but as a privilege earned through strength and the capacity to overcome. This interpretation stands in stark contrast to modern liberal conceptions of freedom.

Nietzsche's perspective could be seen as an apologia for a form of social Darwinism, where the strong not only survive but thrive, and where conflict and danger are viewed as catalysts for self-realization and the cultivation of virtue (Tugend). However, it's crucial to note that Nietzsche's use of such imagery is often metaphorical and should not be interpreted literally as an endorsement of fascism or tyranny.

F: Indeed, Nietzsche's conception of freedom is inextricably linked to his critique of modernity. He views modern society as having lost the instincts and traditions that gave rise to strong institutions. This loss, in his view, has led to a superficial understanding of freedom that prioritizes immediate gratification over long-term strength and cultural continuity.

Nietzsche's criticism extends to modern social structures, including marriage. He laments that marriage, once a means of establishing familial and societal strength, has been reduced to a matter of fleeting emotion ("love"). This exemplifies his broader critique of modernity as short-sighted and lacking in historical consciousness.

In "Menschliches, Allzumenschliches" (Human, All Too Human), Nietzsche argues that democracy, far from being a pinnacle of human achievement, represents a decline in organizing power. He sees it as a symptom of societal weakness rather than strength.

Nietzsche advocates for institutions built on a will to tradition, respect for authority, and a sense of responsibility to both past and future generations. This perspective challenges the liberal notion of progress and instead emphasizes the importance of cultural continuity and the cultivation of strength over time.

It's important to note that while Nietzsche's ideas can be interpreted as anti-democratic or even proto-fascist, such readings often oversimplify his complex and nuanced philosophy. His work is better understood as a radical critique of modern values and an attempt to reimagine human potential beyond the constraints of conventional morality.

 For Nietzsche, modern freedom is not liberation but a destructive force that dissolves the traditional institutions which once bridged the past with the future. His disdain for modernity stems from his belief that, in the contemporary world, people live only for the present moment, in a state of haste and irresponsibility—what is ironically referred to as "freedom" today. 

A superficial reading of his works often leads to misinterpretations, as seen in the misunderstandings propagated by figures like Dariush Ashouri. A deeper engagement with Nietzsche reveals just how sharply he critiques modernity.

In *Kritik der Modernität*, Nietzsche writes:

"Our institutions are no longer intelligent—everyone agrees on this. But this failure is not theirs; it is ours. When we lost the instincts from which institutions arise, we ceased to deserve them, and so they decayed. Democracy, in particular, has always represented a diminution of organizing power. I demonstrated in *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* how democracy, even in the German Empire (*Deutsches Reich*), led to a decline in the state’s authority.

For institutions to endure, there must be a powerful will—a motivation or even a compulsion—that is anti-liberal, even malicious in its intensity, and driven by a desire for tradition, service to authority, and responsibility toward future generations. This desire creates a continuity between past and future—a chain of interdependence that stretches across centuries, even into infinity.

When this desire exists, entities like the Roman Empire or Russia arise, powers capable of patience and commitment. Russia, in particular, stands in contrast to the fractured and petty states of Europe, which reached their zenith of degeneration with the formation of the German Empire. The West no longer possesses the instincts from which institutions spring or the energy from which the future grows. Perhaps nothing more urgently requires a 'psycho-nova,' a new psychology, than the modern Western mind. In this age, everyone lives for the present day, hastily and irresponsibly—this is what we now call 'freedom.'

True institutions are resented, feared, and rejected, even as 'authority' is loudly proclaimed. But lurking beneath this veneer is a deep terror of new forms of slavery. Thus, the decadence of modernity has advanced, corroding the value instincts of our politicians and political parties alike.

Modern marriage is illustrative of this decay. *Vernunft*, or reason, is masked under the guise of modern marriage, yet there is no true objection to this transformation of marriage. The prevailing stupidity of modern marriage lies in its foundation on legal accountability alone, which reduces it to a hollow, burdensome institution—crippled, as Nietzsche suggests, on both legs.

Marital wisdom, in contrast, once rested on a fundamental integrity that transcended mere emotion and passion, and included familial responsibility in the choice of spouse. With the unchecked rise of marriages based on *Liebes-Heirat*—marriages founded on love—the true basis of marriage, that which once made it an institution, has been lost entirely. 

An institution can never be sustained by idiosyncrasy. No one can build marriage on the foundation of 'love.' Rather, it must be rooted in other instincts: the desire for progeny, the pursuit of wealth, or the drive for dominance. Marriage, in its traditional form, was a structure of power—a means of organizing authority within the family, ensuring its survival through the generations, and binding together the instincts of continuity for physiological and material reasons.

The affirmation (*Bejahung*) of marriage as an institution stems from its acceptance as the most powerful form of societal organization. When society can no longer affirm itself through this institution across generations, marriage loses its significance. Modern marriage, as it stands today, has lost this meaning and, for Nietzsche, should therefore be abolished."

In this critique, Nietzsche argues that modern freedom is a shallow parody of true freedom. It undermines the very institutions that once bound society together, particularly marriage, which has devolved into an ephemeral arrangement based on fleeting emotions rather than long-standing social and familial commitments. Through his analysis, Nietzsche calls for a return to a stronger, more disciplined understanding of freedom—one that acknowledges the necessity of institutions, authority, and continuity. 

Thus, as we can see, Nietzsche here articulates a vision of freedom that is closely tied to aristocratic ideals—a 'true freedom' that involves the preservation of class distinctions and the pursuit of strength, even to the edge of slavery. War, in this view, offers the most fertile ground for the flourishing of freedom."

F. Nietzsche provocatively links freedom with the struggle for power, suggesting that only through facing and overcoming great opposition can true freedom be realized. His notion of freedom is inextricably tied to strength and mastery, echoing an aristocratic worldview that places nobility and power above equality and comfort.

Nietzsche's anti-Christian sentiments are a recurring theme in his works, culminating in his identification with the figure of the Antichrist, as reflected in his book *Der Antichrist*. Nietzsche viewed himself as a challenger to Christian morality, seeking to supplant Christian values with those drawn from the ancient cultures of Greece and Rome. This shift, he believed, would restore the cultural and ethical framework of the West, which had been corrupted by Christian dogma. In works such as *Jenseits von Gut und Böse: Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft* (*Beyond Good and Evil: A Prelude to the Philosophy of the Future*), Nietzsche critiques the ethical foundations of the West, particularly Christian morality, which he saw as a degradation of human potential. His project sought to reestablish character and values in alignment with nature, as epitomized by figures like Goethe, and to replace Christian virtues with those of strength, power, and vitality.

Nietzsche explores the origins of Christian morality by examining the historical context in which it emerged, asking pointed questions: Whose values are these? What interests do they serve? What hidden qualities do they conceal, and why must these qualities remain obscure? For Nietzsche, morality arises from two distinct perspectives: the morality of the herd, which belongs to the weak, the impoverished, and the slaves, and the morality of the strong, embodied by the ruling classes—lords, predators, and warriors. The latter, Nietzsche argues, act from a position of strength and ability, shaping their actions and judgments accordingly. His goal was to replace the morality that had governed two thousand years of Christian history with the values of Homeric heroes and noble lords, who were concerned with wealth and power in this world, rather than the promises of another. Nietzsche’s moral framework for this world is detached from concepts such as conscience and compassion and is far more concerned with achievements and the exertion of power.

Nietzsche sought to elevate the values of the nobility—those whose wealth and strength manifest in the present world, rather than in some imagined afterlife. For these elites, morality and virtue are defined by their power and accomplishments. Nietzsche's heroes are not motivated by peace or harmony but by the pursuit of dominance and success in this world. The measure of "good" in such a moral framework is rooted in the extent to which one can wield force effectively and achieve greatness.

G: In addressing Nietzsche’s contradictions, Karl Jaspers cautions readers of Nietzsche’s work to approach his writings with care. Jaspers highlights that Nietzsche often contradicts himself, urging readers never to feel they have fully grasped Nietzsche's meaning until they have also found a statement of his that opposes the first. This inconsistency is not an accident but rather an essential feature of Nietzsche's philosophy. Reviewers of Nietzsche’s work have consistently noted this element, but it should not be seen as a sign of nihilism. For Nietzsche, grappling with contradictions frees the mind from absurdity, rejecting the Western intellectual obsession with eliminating inconsistencies.

In *Der Wille zur Macht* (*The Will to Power*), Nietzsche explains this necessity:

"*Die subjektive Nötigung, hier nicht widersprechen zu können, ist eine biologische Nötigung: der Instinkt der Nützlichkeit, so zu schließen wie wir schließen, steckt uns im Leibe, wir sind beinahe dieser Instinkt... Welche Naivetät aber, daraus einen Beweis zu ziehen, daß wir damit eine »Wahrheit an sich« besäßen! ... Das Nicht-widersprechen-können beweist ein Unvermögen, nicht eine 'Wahrheit'.*"  

(The subjective necessity that compels us to avoid contradiction is a biological necessity: the instinct for utility that shapes our thinking is rooted in our bodies—we are almost entirely this instinct... But what naivety it is to believe that this compulsion provides us with a 'truth in itself'! The inability to contradict only proves a deficiency, not the possession of 'truth.')  

Nietzsche suggests that the acceptance of contradiction is a biological imperative, stemming from the rational decision-making instincts embedded within us. This does not, however, lead to the discovery of any objective truth; rather, it reveals the limitations of our cognitive faculties.

Nietzsche and Critical History

G. The above tension is evident in Nietzsche's *Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben* (*On the Use and Abuse of History for Life*), the second part of his book *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen* (*Untimely Meditations*). In this essay, Nietzsche engages in a cultural critique, weighing the benefits and harms of history for life. He argues that while history can support life, it can also undermine it—though his definitions of both "life" and "history" remain elusive. Sometimes Nietzsche speaks of history in terms of *res gestae* (events that have happened), sometimes as *historia rerum gestarum* (the narrative of what has happened), and at other times as the scholarly "knowledge of history." This ambiguity further complicates his critique.

Some Nietzschean scholars argue that Nietzsche believed learning from history should be subordinated to living life directly. Nietzsche’s distrust of inherited knowledge and traditions leads to the interpretation that he rejects the lessons of the past in favor of personal experience. However, this interpretation is reductive. Nietzsche does not suggest we reinvent the wheel but rather warns against the excesses of historical consciousness, which he sees as detrimental to vitality. Nietzsche writes:

"Dass das Leben aber den Dienst der Historie brauche, muss ebenso deutlich begriffen werden als der Satz, der später zu beweisen sein wird – dass ein Übermaß der Historie dem Lebendigen schade."

("The truth that life needs history should be understood just as clearly as the statement, which will later be proven, that an excess of history is harmful to the living.")

Nietzsche begins by asserting that life requires a delicate balance with history. He introduces the concept of life as being "non-historical," meaning that, in its purest form, life exists without the burdens of historical consciousness. This, Nietzsche argues, is why animals, as well as children, live in a state of historical innocence, free from the weight of the past and concerns for the future. It is this simplicity that enables fleeting moments of happiness and intoxication to arise within human existence. Nietzsche contends that it is our capacity for memory, which differentiates us from animals, that both constructs our personal histories and impedes our ability to live contentedly, as animals do. He writes:

"[Die Tiere sind] kurz angebunden mit ihrer Lust und Unlust, nämlich an den Pflock des Augenblickes und deshalb weder schwermüthig noch überdrüssig."

("Animals are tethered briefly to their pleasure and displeasure, attached to the stake of the moment, and thus neither melancholic nor weary.")

Nietzsche observes that animals live moment-to-moment, experiencing neither the exhaustion nor the disillusionment that plagues human beings. It is the human capacity for memory and foresight that separates us from this animal contentment, leading to both pride and envy. Although humans take pride in their ability to reflect on the past and anticipate the future, they also envy the happiness of animals, which is derived from their ability to live fully in the present. Humans long to free themselves from the weight of memory and the anxiety of the future, but this wish is paradoxical, as it conflicts with their very nature. Nietzsche asserts that animals are happy because they are unburdened by memories of the past and concerns for the future, whereas humans, weighed down by the past, struggle to live in the present. He writes:

"Every human being and every culture has the 'ability to transform and use the past and the alien,' and all strength, health, and creativity arise from this ability."

Nietzsche believed that individuals and cultures have the capacity to take elements from the past and from other cultures (the “alien”) and transform them into something new and meaningful within their own context. This process of assimilation and reinterpretation is what he saw as a source of strength, health, and creativity.  This power also dictates the extent to which history can be absorbed into life without becoming an overwhelming burden. When memory becomes too heavy, people lose their connection to life, and the joy that once sustained them is called into question. Thus, Nietzsche argues that history should be used only to the extent that it nourishes life and culture, never as a tool to stifle or impede it.

At this point, one might ask: if the ability to adapt life determines how much history is necessary, do weaker cultures require less history to thrive? Conversely, do the powerful and noble need more history, and does this make them unhappier? These are not criticisms, but rather reflections on Nietzsche’s provocations, for Nietzsche himself rarely offers definitive answers. His thoughts are complex and often paradoxical, and it is uncommon to find a historian who would not wish to know as much history as possible.

Despite Nietzsche's critique of an excessive reliance on history, he does not entirely reject memory or historical consciousness. Instead, he acknowledges its utility for everyone, while distinguishing between different types of history. He categorizes history into various forms, each with distinct effects on individuals and cultures. He differentiates between "monumental history" and "antiquarian history," seeing these as opposite in their influence but equally necessary for the stability and identity of both individuals and societies. However, when one type of history dominates at the expense of the other, it can have detrimental effects. To address this imbalance, Nietzsche introduces a third category, "critical history," which serves as a corrective to the excesses of the other two.

According to Nietzsche, "glorious history" belongs to the "active and striving" individual, one who is driven by the need to create and achieve greatness in the present. This form of history serves as a motivational force; when a person aspires to accomplish something grand but doubts its feasibility, a look to the past can reveal that others have achieved similar feats. Such historical precedent reassures the individual that greatness is possible. However, Nietzsche warns that an excess of this type of history can lead to mythologizing and hero worship, distorting reality and creating unattainable ideals.

In contrast, "antiquarian history" is the kind of history that "preserves and honors" the past. It roots individuals and cultures in their historical identity, preventing them from defining themselves in purely self-centered and arbitrary terms. This connection to the past fosters continuity and cultural heritage. Yet, Nietzsche cautions that an overreliance on antiquarian history can be stifling. When the past is venerated to the extent that everything that has come before is considered great and sacrosanct, it becomes a barrier to progress, closing off avenues to the future.

The third type of history Nietzsche identifies is "critical history," which belongs to the individual "who suffers and seeks liberation." Critical history examines and interrogates the memories preserved by both glorious and antiquarian history, striving to mitigate their excesses and refine them. However, Nietzsche acknowledges that even critical history carries the potential for trauma. He posits that nothing in history is worthy of eternal preservation, and thus, critical history must also leave room for renewal. It should allow for the possibility of drawing on the experiences of the past in order to create something new in the future.

These nuanced observations, however, are often obscured in Nietzsche's works, hidden beneath his provocative style and aphoristic formulations. One of his most profound contributions may be his insistence on the need for balance among the three types of history. He suggests that the interplay of these historical modes must be tempered by "art," using the example of history's role in historical dramas, where the past is reshaped for contemporary understanding and expression. He writes:

"Mit dem Worte 'das Unhistorische' bezeichne ich die Kunst und Kraft, vergessen zu können und sich einen begrenzten Horizont einzuschließen; 'überhistorisch' nenne ich die Mächte, die den Blick von dem Werden ablenken, hin zu dem, was dem Dasein den Charakter des Ewigen und Gleichbedeutenden gibt, zu Kunst und Religion."

("With the word 'unhistorical' I designate the art and power to forget and enclose oneself within a limited horizon; 'meta-historical' I call those forces that divert our gaze from becoming, and turn it towards what grants existence the character of the eternal and the equivalent — toward art and religion.")

Here, Nietzsche argues for the necessity of what he calls the "unhistorical" — the capacity to forget and live within a finite horizon. This quality allows for the simplicity of experience, unburdened by an overwhelming historical consciousness. Equally important is what Nietzsche terms the "meta-historical," which shifts our perspective away from the transient and towards that which imparts an eternal quality to life, namely, art and religion.

Nietzsche and Science

G. Nietzsche adopts an aggressive stance toward purely knowledge-based approaches, which he believes strip history of its vitality by depriving it of what he calls the "pious lies" of religion and art. He sees a life dominated by knowledge alone as diminished, lacking the instinctual vigor that once governed human existence. He goes so far as to say:

"Ja, man triumphiert darüber, dass jetzt 'die Wissenschaft anfange über das Leben zu herrschen': möglich, dass man das erreicht; aber gewiss ist ein derartig beherrschtes Leben nicht viel wert, weil es viel weniger Leben ist und viel weniger Leben für die Zukunft verbürgt, als das ehemals nicht durch das Wissen, sondern durch Instinkte und kräftige Wahnbilder beherrschte Leben."

("Yes, people celebrate the triumph that 'science is now beginning to rule over life': it may be possible to achieve this; but surely such a life is not worth much, for it is much less life and much less a guarantor of future life than the life once ruled not by knowledge, but by instincts and powerful illusions.")

Nietzsche here critiques the modern faith in science and reason, warning that a life governed entirely by knowledge is impoverished. Such a life lacks the vitality and spontaneity that characterized earlier forms of existence, which were driven by instincts and illusions rather than by rational calculation. In Nietzsche's view, the overreliance on knowledge diminishes the richness of life and its capacity to sustain future generations, for it sacrifices the deeper, more instinctual aspects of human existence that have historically been the true guarantors of life and creativity.

F: It is likely that Nietzsche follows the Hegelian method of dialectical inquiry, striving to achieve a synthesis through slow and deep contemplation of thesis and antithesis. Nietzsche felt a profound disillusionment with the contemporary culture of Europe, which he viewed as an antithesis—a reaction against the culture of ancient Greece, which he considered the thesis. This reaction was largely shaped by the collision between Roman culture and the Neo-Platonic Christian beliefs that ultimately reshaped the West. Nietzsche lamented that the Persian culture did not become the cultural successor to Greece, wishing instead that this ancient heritage had continued to influence the Western world. However, like many Western scholars, Nietzsche was prone to misinterpretation, conflating the Mithraic tradition of the Magi with Zoroastrianism. He failed to recognize that Zurvan, the deity of time in Mithraism, was not synonymous with Ahura Mazda, the supreme god of Zoroastrianism. In Zurvan’s cosmology, it is from his essence that both the goodness of Ahura Mazda and the malice of Angra Mainyu (Ahriman) flow. Symbols of cyclical time—such as the Mithraic bull, scorpion, snake, dog, raven, and twins—are found throughout Mithraic iconography, especially in cave sanctuaries dedicated to Mithras. These figures represent the zodiacal signs, and Mithras himself was believed to transition from one sign to another on the night of Yalda, every 2,160 years, finally returning to the original sign after 25,000 years, marking the completion of a great cosmic cycle. This emphasis on cyclical time and the celebration of life on earth are what drew Nietzsche to the Persian poet Hafez, whose verses exult in a worldly existence, and who likened himself to a seal, believing his heart would live eternally in its imprint.

G: Indeed, Nietzsche often examines a thesis and its antithesis, sometimes reaching a synthesis. However, more often, he explores contradictions from disparate angles and suggests various possible resolutions without ever committing to a final conclusion. His thinking does not offer an easy path to synthesis, and thus, Nietzsche leaves his readers to draw their own conclusions from his work, a characteristic of what he called "perspectivism."

F: It is possible, then, that Daryush Ashouri’s misunderstandings arise from his failure to recognize the Hegelian logic underlying Nietzsche’s thought. Yet, Nietzsche himself bears some responsibility, as he rarely offers clear resolutions to the problems he explores. Readers are left to align themselves with different parts of his thought—whether with a particular proposition or vocabulary—leading to the famous notion that there are as many interpretations of Nietzsche as there are readers. This is the essence of his perspectivism.

Hegel and the Idea of the "Death of God"

G: True, but Ashouri's difficulties stem not only from misinterpretation but also from a lack of familiarity with the intellectual tradition Nietzsche was engaging with. For instance, Ashouri attributes the idea of the "death of God" exclusively to Nietzsche, who famously presented this concept in *The Gay Science*. Yet we know that Nietzsche was not the first to articulate this idea. Hegel introduced the notion of God's death at least three times in his works, first in his 1802 essay *Faith and Knowledge* (*Glauben und Wissen*) and later in his 1807 work *Phenomenology of Spirit* (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*), particularly in the section on the revelation of religion (*Die offenbarte Religion*). However, Ashouri seems unaware of this, stating instead that Nietzsche’s *The Gay Science*, published a year before *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, was the first text to present the idea of God's death in a "preliminary outline!" He asserts that in *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche further develops this concept, tracing its moral, psychological, and sociological consequences. It is true that Ashouri’s translation of *The Gay Science* as *Happy Knowledge* is more accurate than his earlier *Laughing Knowledge*, and he should be credited for this improvement. Nevertheless, his assumption that the idea of God's death originated with Nietzsche reflects an incomplete understanding of the intellectual lineage that Nietzsche was drawing upon.

F: Yes, it is intriguing that in *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche speaks almost as if addressing the appearance of Zurvan, the God of Time:

"Wie, wenn dir eines Tages oder Nachts, ein Dämon in deine einsamste Einsamkeit nachschliche und dir sagte: „Dieses Leben, wie du es jetzt lebst und gelebt hast, wirst du noch einmal und noch unzählige Male leben müssen; und es wird nichts Neues daran sein, sondern jeder Schmerz und jede Lust und jeder Gedanke und Seufzer und alles unsäglich Kleine und Grosse deines Lebens muss dir wiederkommen, und Alles in der selben Reihe und Folge – und ebenso diese Spinne und dieses Mondlicht zwischen den Bäumen, und ebenso dieser Augenblick und ich selber. Die ewige Sanduhr des Daseins wird immer wieder umgedreht – und du mit ihr, Stäubchen vom Staube!“ - Würdest du dich nicht niederwerfen und mit den Zähnen knirschen und den Dämon verfluchen, der so redete? Oder hast du einmal einen ungeheuren Augenblick erlebt, wo du ihm antworten würdest: „du bist ein Gott und nie hörte ich Göttlicheres!“ 

And what if, one day or night, in your deepest solitude, a demon crept silently by your side and whispered into your ear: "This life which you now live, and have lived until now, must be lived again, and countless times more. Nothing will be new; each agony, each delight, every thought, every sigh, every unspeakably small or grand event of your life will recur in the same sequence and in the same order. Even this spider, this moonlight filtering through the trees, even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned over again and again—and you with it, a speck of dust among the dust!" Would you not cast yourself down and gnash your teeth, cursing the demon who proclaimed such a prophecy? Or perhaps, once in a moment of immense wonder, you might answer: "Truly, you are a god, and never have I heard anything more divine!"

For Nietzsche, the values of the slaves—those whose reward is deferred to an afterlife presided over by a dead god—are devoid of worth. The only values that matter are those of this world, the values of the nobles, the lords, and the powerful, who are free from any dependence on metaphysical constructs. According to Nietzsche, Christian values are born from the resentment of the Christian slaves of Rome, who rose up in opposition to the values of their masters and slave owners. By promising reward and punishment in the "other world," they harbored hatred towards those who enslaved them. On the other hand, the values of Roman Mithraists and their military elite were grounded in power and dominance. They felt no shame or regret for oppressing slaves and subordinates, and cruelty towards the weak was normalized within this hierarchy.

Within this intellectual framework, Nietzsche's concept of going *"beyond good and sin"* becomes intelligible. We consciously translate *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* as "Beyond Good and Sin," diverging from Mr. Ashouri's rendering, *Farasooye Nick o Bad* ("Beyond Good and Bad"). This choice reflects Nietzsche's desire to transcend the Christian moral binaries of "good" and "sin." On one end of the moral spectrum, "goodness" is defined by the values of the downtrodden: kindness, friendship, compassion, and assistance—virtues Nietzsche perceives as central to Christian ethics, which extols the weak, the suffering, and the oppressed. Conversely, the absence of these virtues is labeled "sin." Yet for the masters, Nietzsche posits an alternate moral alignment: "good" embodies strength, power, and efficacy, while "sin" represents their negation, the weakness and impotence codified in the notion of "Original Sin."

In this balance of values, it is possible for a man (and not a woman!) to strive towards becoming a *Übermensch*, a superman. Human beings, by their nature alone, have no intrinsic value; it is only through strength and the will to power that they attain worth. Nietzsche argues that if we desire greatness and dignity in our new culture, we must relinquish compassion and kindness for the weak and destitute, and instead focus on achievement. What is most valuable in a culture are its elites—those few who, though small in number, are capable of creating monumental works. According to Nietzsche, the culture of Christian values in the West has shirked its responsibility to cultivate and support its elites, those with the creative power to advance knowledge and art, and has instead found contentment in maintaining the herd of the poor and helpless. Thus, one must go beyond good and sin—towards a realm that honors extraordinary achievements and flees from the ordinary, from the life of the common herd.

G: Yes, it is here that Nietzsche speaks of the "eternal repetition of  the same" Die Ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen and portrays the horror of man's separation from metaphysics in which there is no God. He believes that the only way to overcome these events, which will repeat themselves without any change, is to accept this inevitable fate. And for him, now that it is like this, he should live as if he was always happy in this eternity.

But it is not clear that this solution will lead to exactly the same result that the pious people of faith are hoping for, and this is what our mystics have also said that they worship their God not for the sake of heaven, but because of their fascination with him. So, if life has to be repeated in the same way for eternity, it will no longer be wise to steal and kill people and do evil because if you do that, you will have to repeat this evil forever. And if this is not important to you, then you will be like the untouchables in India, who are condemned to live with their unjust "karma" forever.

This is the difficulty of Nietzsche's thinker that everything that appeared is true and there is no truth behind the phenomena. And according to him, the difference in views originates from our "perspectivism" in our thoughts. Although I must also say that this view of mine is more inspired by Albert Camus's Sisyphus than Nietzsche.

Camus sees this "continuity-of-the-same" absurdity in a world that is silent and indifferent to the destiny and the absurd life of man in the symbol of the legend of Sisyphus, who constantly has to roll a big stone up a hill, but as soon as the stone reaches the top of the hill, It flows down the hill. Camus writes:

C'est pendant ce retour, cette pause, que Sisyphe m'interesse. Un visage qui peine si près des pierres est deja pierre lui même! Je vois cet homme redescendre d'un pas lourd mais égal vers le torment dont il ne connaîtra pas la fin

 During this return, it is during this time that I think of Sisyphus. A face that suffers so close to stones is like a stone itself! I see this man as he comes down the hill with a heavy but level step towards the reversal  for which he does not see an end.

At this moment, it is truly heartening that a person like Sisyphus becomes aware of the sad fate of "the same thing over and over again" and realizes that there is no hope for him to escape from this whirlwind. But:

il n'est pas de destin qui ne se surmonte par le mépris

There is no fate that cannot be overcome by scorn.

Sisyphus, having received and understood this way, still does not stop trying like the absurd man l'homme absurde. According to Camus, when Sisyphus realizes the futility of his life and his eternal destiny in slumber and emptiness, the acceptance of "irreversible failure" is his défaite certaine that frees him and fills him up. This simple reception and acceptance is already a "rebellion" une révolte, which culminates in his "victory" victoire. So, like Camus, they can come to the conclusion that "everything is good" tout est bien because "one must pretend that Sisyphus is happy". il faut imaginer Sisyphe heureux.

Nietzsche and Democracy

F: Nietzsche’s political views on democracy can be discerned from writings published posthumously, notably *Der griechische Staat*. This work was part of a manuscript entitled *Fünf Vorreden zu fünf ungeschriebenen Büchern* ("Five Introductions to Five Unwritten Books"), which he presented to Cosima Wagner on her birthday.

In the opening of this text, Nietzsche contrasts modernity with ancient Greek political thought, observing:

"We moderns have surpassed the Greeks in two ways: we inhabit a world that, though inherently servile, adamantly avoids the term 'slave.' We speak instead of 'human frailty' and 'labor weakness.' This inappropriate need for suffering prevents individuals from engaging in base acts."

Nietzsche views this text as a reinterpretation of Plato's *Eudaimonic State*, suggesting that the state’s profound connection to intelligence and governance should be eternally acknowledged. He contends that the state did not arise from a contractual agreement, as posited by Rousseau, but through violent subjugation and the sudden imposition of power.

In this framework, Nietzsche describes the "founder of the first state" as a "military genius" and "conqueror with iron fists." He posits that the establishment of the state results in the enslavement of the defeated, concluding the *bellum omnium contra omnes* (war of all against all). Nietzsche further elaborates on this perspective in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, asserting:

"I have employed the term 'government': it is evident to whom it pertains—a cadre of golden-haired predators, a master race engaged in organized warfare, wielding the power to subjugate. Fearlessly, they extend their fearsome claws over individuals who may surpass them in number, yet remain faceless and in flux. Thus, the 'government' emerged on Earth: and I believe I have dispelled the illusion that government began with a 'contract.'"

Nietzsche’s writings reveal his skepticism towards democracy. He critiques burgeoning democratic movements of his era and advocates for a concept he terms *Aristokratischer Radikalismus* ("radical aristocracy"), not as a traditional hierarchy but through the cultivation of elites poised to govern Europe and dominate the world. Nietzsche borrowed this notion from Georg Brandes, writing:

"Until now, all advancements of the 'human' species have been the work of elite groups (aristocratic societies)—and it will be so again. This group believes in a high ladder of positions and the differentiation of values between individuals, deeming slavery, in one form or another, necessary."

It is undeniable that Nietzsche's ideas were rooted in a contentious and provocative framework. His philosophy was appropriated by various ideologies, including Nazism and Fascism, and continues to be co-opted by extreme right-wing and authoritarian movements.

G: Nietzsche perceives the state as a coercive apparatus designed to initiate and maintain a mass process. He refers to the "iron grip of the government," which not only binds but also stratifies the populace into a hierarchical structure akin to a pyramid. In this schema, war generates a military hierarchy, mirroring the state’s own pyramidal organization. Nietzsche regards this military structure as an "Abbild" (representation) and perhaps the true blueprint of governance, originating from military genius.

Nietzsche and the Role of Government

G. According to Nietzsche, the fundamental mission and purpose of government is to forge a "select group of Olympian heroes" tasked with cultivating a high culture. Within this framework, slavery is regarded as the "jewel of culture," serving as a foundational element in this hierarchical structure. Slaves, positioned at the lowest echelons of this pyramid-like system, bear the brunt of poverty, thereby enhancing the prestige of the elite minority at the apex who are tasked with cultural creation. Nietzsche explicitly categorizes contemporary slaves as "slaves in factories," describing them as "unknown and identityless."

Nietzsche’s "new men," envisioned as Europeans, are to rule over Europe and pursue "great strategies" for the global establishment of a Platonic racial education. In *Der Antichrist*, Nietzsche adopts the ancient Indian Manu system’s hierarchical model for his societal design. He divides humanity into three "differently valued" categories, likening this classification to a "Goethean law of the first order." 

Nietzsche posits that it is not the divine realm but rather the intrinsic forces of nature that delineate societal strata. He categorizes individuals into three distinct classes: the first comprises those endowed with profound intellectual acumen and wisdom; the second includes individuals who exhibit notable physical strength and a combative spirit; and the third encompasses those who manifest neither of these attributes. The third category, representing the majority, is characterized by its insignificance, while the first category, distinguished by its exceptional qualities, aligns with Nietzsche's concept of the "aristocrats."

F: Nietzsche’s philosophy indeed contains elements that have been interpreted in various ways, some of which have been used to justify harmful ideologies. It’s important to recognize the multifaceted nature of his work and the historical context in which it has been interpreted.

Walter Kaufmann and other scholars have argued that Nietzsche’s ideas were misappropriated by the Nazis and that his sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, played a significant role in shaping his posthumous image to align with their ideology. Kaufmann, in particular, sought to present Nietzsche as a critic of both democracy and populism, without a coherent political vision that could be directly linked to fascism.

On the other hand, scholars like David Allison and Alexander Nehamas have offered different interpretations, often distancing themselves from Kaufmann’s views. They emphasize Nietzsche’s critique of modernity and his exploration of existential themes, rather than focusing on his political implications.

It’s crucial to approach Nietzsche’s work with a critical eye, acknowledging both the valuable insights and the problematic aspects. His critiques of European urbanism and other societal issues can be seen as astute, but they should not overshadow the more troubling elements of his philosophy.

For some , Nietzsche’s philosophical contributions are seen as reflections of his psychological state, and from a libertarian perspective, should be criticized as long as they remain personal beliefs without practical political application.

Conversely, scholars such as Tracy Strong, Keith Ansell-Pearson, and notably Henning Ottmann in his esteemed *Habilitationsschrift* on Nietzsche, as well as Daniel Conway, argue that Nietzsche should be regarded as a political thinker. According to Kanoe, Nietzsche’s commitment to a form of perfectionism is central to his political thought: Nietzsche's "only justification" for human existence lies in the capacity for continuous self-improvement (permanent ability to perfectibility), as evidenced by the achievements of exemplary individuals.

In conclusion, the debate over whether Nietzsche should be considered a political thinker or an opponent of politics remains unresolved in Western scholarship. It is essential to acknowledge Nietzsche’s views on racial superiority and the legitimacy of slavery, akin to the controversial assertions of Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Hume, while also critically assessing their broader philosophical contributions.

G: When contemplating Nietzsche's wisdom, it is prudent to recall what he wrote about himself at the outset of his work "Ecce Homo" ("Behold the Man"). He states:

"I want no 'believers'; I think I am too malicious to believe in myself; I never speak to the masses... I have a terrible fear that one day I will be pronounced holy: one will guess why I am publishing this book beforehand - it should prevent people from committing mischief with me..."

Nietzsche viewed the decay of European culture as untenable. This culture believed it had found, or would soon find, answers to all its questions. However, Nietzsche sought to subject all values to a re-evaluation - a "transvaluation of all values" (Umwertung aller Werte). Regarding this highest form of human self-examination, he writes in "Thus Spoke Zarathustra":

"Whoever must be a creator in good and bad - verily, he must first be an annihilator and break values. Thus the highest evil belongs to the highest goodness: but this is creative."

This passage does not cast a particularly favorable light on why the inversion of values enables "becoming human." One might concede that some values should be adjusted or made more consistent, but inverting the entire hierarchy of values seems perilous. For instance, could the murder of an innocent ever be elevated to the highest virtue through such an inversion? Although Nietzsche does not directly address this, he seems aware of the instability and difficulty of this proposition. He attempts to resolve this by elucidating his perception of Zarathustra:

"The question has never been asked: what does the name Zarathustra mean in my mouth, in the mouth of the first immoralist? For what constitutes the tremendous historical uniqueness of that Persian is precisely the opposite. Zarathustra was the first to see in the struggle between good and  bad the actual wheel in the working of things. The translation of morality into the metaphysical, as force, cause, and end-in-itself, is his work."

Nietzsche continues to expound on Zarathustra's significance:

"Zarathustra created this most calamitous error, morality; consequently, he must also be the first to recognize it. Not only has he more experience in this matter, for a longer time, than any other thinker - all history is indeed the experimental refutation of the proposition of a so-called 'moral world order' - what is more important is that Zarathustra is more truthful than any other thinker. His doctrine, and his alone, posits truthfulness as the highest virtue - this means the opposite of the cowardice of the 'idealist' who flees from reality. Zarathustra has more intestinal fortitude than all other thinkers taken together. To tell the truth and to shoot well with arrows, that is Persian virtue. Have I been understood? The self-overcoming of morality through truthfulness, the self-overcoming of the moralist into his opposite - into me - that is what the name Zarathustra means in my mouth."

Despite the complexity of Nietzsche's discourse, an inconsistency emerges here. He appears to value Zarathustra's good character, morality, and truthfulness, yet simultaneously rejects conventional morality. This apparent contradiction leads us to synthesize that good (virtue) and bad (Bimanesh) are two sides of the same coin, unable to exist without each other.

Nietzsche attempts to clarify his perspective further:

"Fundamentally, my term immoralist involves two negations. First, I negate the type of man that has so far been considered supreme: the good, the benevolent, the beneficent. And then I negate a kind of morality that has become prevalent and predominant as morality itself - the morality of décadence or, more concretely, Christian morality."

Nietzsche posits that his perspective is an affirmative view of life. In his estimation, the psychology of a virtuous individual must be weighed against the cost of their maintenance - their conditions of existence (Existenzbedingungen) must be thoroughly examined.

He asserts: "The condition of existence for the good is the lie" (Die Existenz-Bedingung der Guten ist die Lüge), implying that we remain ignorant of how truth is constructed at its foundation. According to Nietzsche, the unsavory aspects of reality (die Furchtbarkeiten der Realität) - its furies, lusts, and will to power - are infinitely more necessary than the trivial niceties that people designate as "goodness."

F. For Nietzsche, the crucial question is not about the "how" of phenomena, but rather their "why," and he contends that European wisdom has failed to provide an answer to this fundamental query. He writes:

"The end of the moral interpretation of the world, which no longer has any sanction after it has tried to escape into some beyond, leads to nihilism. 'Everything lacks meaning'... Since Copernicus, man has been rolling from the center toward 'X'... What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; 'why?' finds no answer."

Nietzsche acknowledges that rationalists like Hegel and Kant have constructed elaborate systems for their rationalism, but he criticizes these constructions as being designed to demonstrate the answer that the creator of the system had predetermined. He states:

"The edifices of wisdom should be regarded as methods of psychic training: they have always cultivated a particular psychic force that was most conducive to their one-sided desire to see things as they wished, rather than as they are."

For Nietzsche, these grand philosophical systems that purport to solve the complexities of human existence with a mere stroke of the pen are nothing more than self-deception. He writes:

"Small questions and experiments (Versuche) were disdained... To solve all difficulties with one stroke of the pen... This was their secret desire... Unbounded ambition... That 'finding the answer to the riddle of the universe' was a thinker's dream. Many harbored the illusion... and to Schopenhauer's fate, that they were the discoverer of the answer."

Perhaps Nietzsche's most significant message is that in the modern world, art has supplanted wisdom. He articulates this in a passage that merits quotation in full:

"The ultimate philosopher - it may be generations. He only has to help life. 'Ultimate,' of course, relative to our world. He proves the necessity of illusion, of art, and of art dominating life. It is no longer possible for us to produce such a succession of philosophers as Greece did in the age of tragedy. Their task is now fulfilled by art alone. Only as art is such a system still possible. From the present standpoint, that whole period of Greek philosophy also falls within the realm of their art."

In this profound statement, Nietzsche suggests that the role once played by philosophy in ancient Greece has now been assumed by art. Only through artistic expression can we now construct systems of thought that give meaning to life, as the age of traditional philosophy has passed. This represents a significant shift in how we approach questions of existence and meaning in the modern world.

G: Despite our previous observations, Nietzsche's characteristic inconsistency persists throughout his work. His thoughts often lack logical coherence and support, compelling him to employ complex, poetic language that invites readers to forge their own connections. This explains the proliferation of diverse interpretations in Nietzschean scholarship. In his view, the future philosopher, who must also be an artist, possesses an incompatible streak with others; their preferences and judgments are deeply personal and idiosyncratic. Their judgment may resemble Dionysian passion rather than Apollonian wisdom. Nietzsche articulates this in a particularly evocative passage:

"A new species of philosophers is coming up: I venture to baptize them with a name not free from danger. As I divulge them, as they allow themselves to be divulged - for it is part of their nature to want to remain a riddle in some respects - these philosophers of the future might be justly, perhaps also unjustly, claimed, characterized, and maligned with the name 'tempters.' This designation itself is in the end only an attempt and, if you will, a temptation.

"Are they new friends of 'truth,' these coming philosophers? Probably, for all philosophers so far have loved their truths. But they will certainly not be dogmatists. It must offend their pride, as well as their taste, if their truth is supposed to be a truth for everyone - which has so far been the secret wish and hidden meaning of all dogmatic aspirations. 'My judgment is my judgment: no one else is easily entitled to it' - such a philosopher of the future may perhaps say. One has to shed the bad taste of wanting to agree with many. 'Good' is no longer good when one's neighbor mouths it. And how could there be a 'common good'! The term contradicts itself: what can be common always has little value. In the end, it must be as it always has been: great things remain for the great, abysses for the profound, nuances and shudders for the refined, and, in brief, all that is rare for the rare."

F: Considering Nietzsche's overall philosophical stance, his reverence for art, and his disparaging tone towards rationality, one might hypothesize a similarity between his thoughts and those of Rumi, who famously declared, "He was a wooden reasoner." Nietzsche condemns modernity and the Enlightenment for their excessive emphasis on knowledge and wisdom, which he sees as divorced from heart and feeling. In "The Birth of Tragedy," Nietzsche favors the Dionysian realm of passion and intoxication over the Apollonian domain of thought and knowledge, because truth in this world is, in his view, essentially "nothing." As Heidegger observes, non-being that has never existed leaves no trace in our memory, and thus non-being is truly non-being.

Nietzsche illustrates this point with a poignant Greek myth:

"An old legend tells how King Midas hunted in the forest a long time for the wise Silenus, the companion of Dionysus, without capturing him. When Silenus at last fell into his hands, the king asked what was the best and most desirable of all things for man. Fixed and immovable, the demigod said not a word, till at last, urged by the king, he gave a shrill laugh and broke out into these words: 'Oh, wretched ephemeral race, children of chance and misery, why do you compel me to tell you what it would be most expedient for you not to hear? What is best of all is utterly beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you is - to die soon.'"

This passage encapsulates Nietzsche's profound pessimism regarding the human condition and his critique of rationalist philosophy's attempts to find meaning in existence.

Nietzsche articulates a profound insight into the human condition:

"Nature has enveloped man in illusions - this is his true element. He perceives forms and senses stimuli instead of truths. He dreams, imagining god-like beings as nature. Man has become, by chance, a cognizant being through the unintentional pairing of two qualities. At some point, he will cease to be, and nothing will have happened."

This notion of existence as illusion resonates with the works of Persian poets like Rumi, who wrote:

"Gratitude for the absence that exists there,

For love of that absence, the world came into being.

Wherever absence arrives, existence diminishes,

The thread of absence, emerging from existence, increases."

Similarly, Hafez, whom Nietzsche likely encountered through Goethe's translations, expressed skepticism towards rational understanding of life's value:

"The world and its affairs are naught upon naught,

I have investigated this point a thousand times.

Seize the opportunity to count time's spoils,

For bandits lurk in life's passage.

Come, repent of the scribe's indolence and the cup's laughter,

It's a tale that reason cannot confirm.

The sweetness in the dimple of the beloved's chin,

A hundred thousand profound thoughts cannot fathom."

These poetic sentiments align with Nietzsche's critique of philosophy's capacity to reveal life's true worth. The hedonistic alternative, championed by Omar Khayyam, proves equally unattainable for most, constrained by quotidian necessities.

Regarding the philosophical conceptions of God, we must consider the nuanced approaches of thinkers like Kant, Kierkegaard, Hegel, and Nietzsche. Each offers a distinct interpretation: Kant situates God within reason, Hegel within historical dynamics, Kierkegaard within faith, and Nietzsche within passion and the heart.

The "God of philosophers" is often contrasted with the Abrahamic God.  Ashouri notes:

"The philosophers' God resides in the intellect, in thought. But the Jewish God - as our Sufis have often said - dwells not in the head but in the heart, in the depths of human being. He is a 'jealous' god, according to the Old Testament, who cannot tolerate any other deity in His vicinity. He is the sole God in Abrahamic religions who seeks to destroy all other gods, all 'tyrants'."

This conception differs markedly from earlier deities like Marduk, Mithra, and Ahura Mazda. The "God of philosophers," often associated with Socrates and Kant, represents a more abstract, rational concept.

Kant's approach to God is particularly noteworthy. As a philosopher championing reason, his most significant discovery was that metaphysical propositions, including those proving or refuting God's existence, are inherently falsifiable. The arguments for and against hold equal validity, rendering them intellectually inadmissible. However, when addressing ethics, Kant sought to construct a moral framework based on rational deduction, independent of divine reward or punishment. This led him to "create" a god founded on moral necessity, a concept that would later influence Nietzsche's critique of traditional morality and religion.

This complex interplay between philosophy, theology, and ethics forms the backdrop against which Nietzsche developed his revolutionary ideas, challenging both traditional religious concepts and Enlightenment rationalism.

Contrary to Ashouri's assertion, Nietzsche's philosophical stance is fundamentally at odds with Kantian reason. Nietzsche poses the provocative question: How can Kant's notion of synthetic a priori judgments be viable? He contends that Kant's belief in the possibility of such judgments rests on the presumption of our possession of the faculties of reason. Nietzsche challenges this, asking how this constitutes a satisfactory answer. However, a comprehensive discussion of Kant's beliefs warrants separate consideration.

It appears that Ashouri has misinterpreted both Kant and his conception of God. My understanding of Kant's God is that it remains an entity that bestows praises, or in Ashouri's terminology, causes and effects. Kant, however, grapples with the Christian notion of God.

Kant's writings exhibit no equivocation. His conception of God is delineated with mathematical precision in his "Critique of Pure Reason." According to this identification, the thought of God leads to the Unconditioned, to the notion of an absolutely necessary being, akin to a transcendental ideal that serves as a prototype of perfection in thought. This ideal is indispensable for understanding everything contingent and manifest in our sensible world. Our reconciliation of sensible experience with the Absolute Being involves imagining the extra-phenomenal truth as a transcendental object: we conceive of it as being, yet it remains unknowable. In simpler terms, Kant posits that a supreme being like God is a necessary concept, inseparable from our understanding of the world's perfection.

In the "Critique of Practical Reason," which addresses ethics, Kant proposes a moral identifier that Ashouri elaborates upon as "a condition of the highest moral value of living." However, this identifier cannot be divorced from the concept of God. Kant delineates the role of a cleric into two parts: first, as a religious teacher who must convey Biblical teachings, and second, as a researcher entitled to his own opinions regarding religious superstitions, suggesting appropriate interpretations. As a religious teacher, one might be compelled to state in a sermon that the world is approximately six thousand years old. As a researcher, however, one must acknowledge current scientific understanding that places the age of the universe at 13.8 billion years. The reconciliation of these disparate views falls within the realm of belief rather than knowledge, and thus their veracity cannot be empirically measured.

In Kant's transcendental philosophy, we observe that the pinnacle of transcendence in the system of thoughts is formed from the three identities of God, the world, and man in the world. Transcendental philosophy, according to Kant, is the act of "consciousness" by which the creator becomes his own creator, and completeness in the classification of everything, in God, is poured into the vessel of a rational system. Intriguingly, Kant himself reveals that this system parallels the thought system of Zarathustra.

It is apt to consider Marduk, Mazda, and Jehovah as conceptually related, given the likelihood of inter-religious influence. The Ahrimanic concept in Zoroastrianism and the Luciferian concept in Judaism (as per Ashouri) likely share common origins.

We can reasonably assert that Kant's God is a God of reason, while Nietzsche's God is a God of love. This distinction is evident in their differing interpretations of the Biblical story of Abraham's sacrifice. Kant, prioritizing reason, suggests that Abraham should have rejected the divine command to sacrifice Isaac, deeming it morally reprehensible. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, however, do not subscribe to the supremacy of human reason in the infinite sphere. Kierkegaard, in "Fear and Trembling," posits that Abraham's infatuation with God compels his obedience, a concept he terms the "Leap of Faith." This leap defies Kantian rational analysis but aligns with mystical beliefs.

Nietzsche's perspective on this matter is complex, as he stands in opposition to both Christianity and Enlightenment thought. The God Nietzsche rejects is primarily the Christian God, reflecting his ongoing critique of Christianity.

Nietzsche's Conflict with Modernity and Enlightenment

G. Indeed, this is precisely why, as I mentioned earlier, Derrida categorizes Nietzsche as a quintessential "deconstructionist." Returning to the trajectory of our discourse, it becomes abundantly clear that in "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," the lamentation of the man bearing a lamp, proclaiming the death of God, is not, as Ashouri suggests, a mere dirge for the fate of nihilistic humanity. Nor are morality and ethics simply barriers against enlightenment. Ashouri posits:

"Nietzsche, on one hand, is deeply concerned about the regression of the God-bereft man without 'horizon,' the nihilistic man, towards the semi-bestial existence of the 'last man.' Conversely, in the erasure of the world's horizon that once received divine illumination, he perceives a newly unveiled vista before humanity; a horizon of a world liberated from metaphysical enticements, legends, and myths, wherein man can imbue existence with meaning through the potency of his will. In other words, he attains the status of the Übermensch, thereby fulfilling the anthropomorphic project initiated by modernity. The death of God is a cataclysmic event for the forsaken servant of God, the lost lamb from Christ's flock. Consequently, the sun sets, nocturnal darkness engulfs all, and the horizon of existence vanishes. Yet, paradoxically, this very event unfolds a novel horizon for the intrepid modern man—a horizon of human existence unshackled from archaic fears and superstitions, a life that can, as Zarathustra advocates, joyfully remain 'faithful to the earth' and not wander between 'two worlds' in metaphysical horizons illuminated by deceptive lights."

Ashouri's assertion that the Nietzschean Übermensch "fulfills the anthropomorphic project initiated by modernity" or that this "event unfolds a novel horizon for the intrepid modern man" betrays a misinterpretation of Nietzsche. For Nietzsche is palpably exasperated and weary of modernity. As Habermas observes, Nietzsche's farewell to the "Enlightenment" marks a pivotal juncture in European thought, heralding the advent of postmodernism.

This innovation emerges from the abortive efforts of Hegel and post-Hegelians, who failed to furnish a dialectic for European thought. Michel Foucault contends that New Europe, particularly Germany, was excessively entangled in wisdom and scientific reasoning, neglecting to delineate the boundaries of folly and to adequately fear the horrific. Despite the ostensible prudence and consideration of the new German government, Foucault posits:

"There is a suspicion that something within rationalism, even hyper-rationalism, has engendered this excessive governmental capacity. This perspective has predominantly emerged among the German left, and indeed, from the Left Hegelians to the Frankfurt School, there exists a pronounced critique of positivism, objectivism, and the nexus between science and technology. The objective of these analyses was to elucidate the relationship between the rudimentary presuppositions of knowledge and the prevailing forms of dominance in contemporary societies."

Nietzsche stands as the progenitor of this apprehension. In "The Will to Power," he writes:

"The pessimism of modernity clearly arose from the vanity of the modern world."

And in "Twilight of the Idols," he asserts:

"The entire West has forfeited those most unsightly human instincts from which institutions sprouted, from which the future burgeoned; perhaps nothing could be more antithetical to the 'modern psyche.' Everyone lives for today, everyone hastens—everyone lives 'freely'; and this is precisely what everyone denominates as 'freedom'."

This presents another inconsistency with the injunction to live for the present! According to Nietzsche, modern ideals such as valuing each individual, striving for universal and inclusive thinking, and empathizing with 'the other' (compassionately), all stem from modern man's fear of subjugation by the powerful. The moderns' fear of inequality (which is inevitable) engenders a desire to "remain invisible in a herd of equal sheep." He does not consider the new idols of modernity, such as humanity or wisdom, capable of leading to pure enlightenment through pure ideals. Rather, he perceives these modern values as symptoms of decay, guiding people solely towards conformity. These are the very values of modernity that he believes should be overthrown, advocating instead for a return to the world of legends and stars—precisely the opposite of Ashouri's interpretation!

As Bernard Mangos and Kathleen Higgins have demonstrated, Nietzsche's view of Greek tragedy is predicated on the interplay of two fundamental principles: the Apollonian—the sun god's domain of order, static beauty, and defined boundaries—and the Dionysian—the realm of chaos, rebellion, unbridled excess, and the dissolution of all boundaries. In Nietzsche's perspective, Greek tragedy is constructed upon the tension between these two principles in pursuit of life's equilibrium. According to Nietzsche, the chorus in Greek tragedy is subject to these dual forces, embodying the quintessence of tragic art.

F: For Nietzsche, systematic morality is a pernicious construct that circumscribes our thinking, feeling, and living. It is a conspicuous emblem of our fundamental ignorance of ourselves and the world. In "Joyful Wisdom," he delineates the four errors that ensnare humanity. We perceive ourselves as incomplete, endowed with narrative qualities, and erroneously categorized alongside animals and Goethe's nature, believing our superiority. Lastly, we fabricate a list of virtues, deeming them eternal and absolute. Nietzsche exhorts us to transcend good and evil, asserting that our prejudices impede this intellectual journey. Our morality feigns a knowledge it does not possess.

G: In a letter to his academic colleague, Jacob Burckhardt, Nietzsche echoes the sentiments of "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" in "Beyond Good and Evil," albeit with a markedly altered perspective on modernity. He contends that a culture's purpose is to produce noble individuals, yet history reveals that European culture has instead bred slaves. In the New World, culture's aim has devolved into taming the savage within civilized urbanites, transforming them into domesticated predators. Contemporary humans incessantly strive for betterment, yet this pursuit often leads to mediocrity, conformity, and a loss of individuality. Nietzsche views this as the greatest peril of the new culture, fostering a creature that seeks to domesticate itself and become a mere sheep within the flock. This marks the end of history for free thought, a European Buddhism that venerates the sympathy of fellow believers as the ultimate moral value, as if morality itself were the pinnacle of human achievement, the sole hope for the future, solace for the present, and salvation from past transgressions.

F: Nietzsche, therefore, advocates for a novel understanding of ethics, one that is critical and perspectival. He eschews conventional notions of morality, viewing it as an emergent phenomenon shaped by historical processes. Consequently, he proposes a reevaluation of all values. While the superiority of the values resulting from this reevaluation is not self-evident, Nietzsche's critique remains profound.

G: In "On the Genealogy of Morals," Nietzsche observes that what is considered "good" within a culture is often unpleasant and even antithetical to politics. In "Ecce Homo," he identifies himself as "anti-political." Nietzsche's values are perhaps most evident in the works of his existentialist followers, Heidegger and Kierkegaard. The association of Nietzsche with Nazism, largely due to the influence of his pro-Nazi sister, has distorted perceptions of his philosophy. Her curation of his works and her dissemination of a pro-Nazi interpretation of certain passages, such as the concept of the "Overman" and the "Will to Power," have contributed to this confusion. For example, his statement in "Twilight of the Idols" regarding the disabled as "leeches" or "parasites" of society and the notion of selective breeding based on perceived worthiness can be interpreted as callous and inhumane.

However, other passages, such as his assertion in "Human, All Too Human" that it is preferable to be destroyed rather than succumb to hatred and fear, suggest a more nuanced understanding of his views. Nietzsche was critical of authoritarianism and statism, denouncing the government as "the most insensitive of all the insensitive demons" in "Thus Spoke Zarathustra." He also recognized the dangers of unchecked power, warning that "to become powerful one must pay a heavy price. Being powerful causes stupidity." His critique of German nationalism, encapsulated in the phrase "Germany, Germany above all," further underscores his distance from authoritarian ideologies.

F: While Nietzsche's brilliance is undeniable, he was not immune to the intellectual currents of his time. His occasional lapses into flawed thinking, influenced by Lamarckian theories and misunderstandings of Darwinian concepts, particularly the notion of the "struggle for existence," led to some misguided conclusions.

G: In "Ecce Homo," Nietzsche vehemently repudiates those who associate him with Darwinian notions of the Übermensch, stating: "This herd of scientific cattle has made me suspicious of Darwinism." Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that he harbored a belief in a form of evolutionary "transformation." In "The Gay Science," he criticizes Schopenhauer for dismissing "metamorphosis" as mystifying and convoluted, while also deriding Lamarck's work as intelligent yet fallacious and absurd. 

Lamarck's now-discredited theory posited that organisms' bodily structures are influenced by their environment, famously exemplified by the giraffe's elongated neck resulting from habitual stretching to reach high foliage. Lamarck argued that such acquired traits were heritable. This contrasts with Darwin's concept of natural selection, which favors individuals with advantageous traits like longer necks.

Nietzsche, however, rejects the Darwinian perspective, asserting that Darwin appropriated the idea of "transformation" from thinkers such as Heraclitus, Empedocles, Lamarck, and Hegel. In "The Gay Science," he particularly emphasizes: "It was Hegel who laid the foundation for Darwin's thought, stating that 'races evolve from one another'... without Hegel, there would never have been Darwinism." Nietzsche contended that Darwin exaggerated the role of "external conditions" to the point of absurdity. He posited that the fundamental factor in life's processes is the great internal shaping force that exploits and benefits from "external conditions."

F: Nietzsche denominates this vital force or great life-shaping force as the "will to power," linking it to the "revaluation of all values." This concept revolves around the axis of "enriching life," manifesting in the symbol of the Übermensch, which signifies "superior humanity." The Übermensch possesses the power of artistic creation and can engender "future philosophy" - a philosophy that transcends good and evil through a novel interpretation and reevaluation of life. Here, Nietzsche reinterprets Kantian reason in a revolutionary manner.

In his self-proclaimed Copernican revolution, Kant concluded in the "Critique of Pure Reason" that "the legislative power of human reason imposes laws on nature, and nature inevitably submits to and obeys these laws." For Nietzsche, an individual capable of legislating nature must be a graceful and worthy being, able to think beyond the established values of virtue and immorality. Their will to power overcomes nihilism and brings joy to knowledge.

G: This juncture provides an apt conclusion to this section. If you concur, we shall terminate our discourse here, and in the subsequent section, I shall elucidate on Kant's Copernican revolution, a topic I know holds particular significance for you.